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DEFAMATION IS MORE THAN JUST A TORT: 
A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR 
INTERNET STUDENT SPEECH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The school is a special environment. While school officials 
must be able to punish student behavior, students have an 
arguably equal interest in preserving their First Amendment 
right to free speech. Through a series of Supreme Court 
decisions, the law is well established that students do not enjoy 
the same First Amendment protections as adults. This 
differential treatment is grounded in historical notions of the 
significant impact schools have on America’s youth.  
As early as Brown v. Board of Education, the Court held 
that education is essential to our democratic society, as schools 
are “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”1 Since 
Brown, the Court has stated that the school must balance the 
“unpopular and controversial views in schools and 
classrooms . . . against the society’s countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate 
behavior.”2 A school does not have to tolerate speech that is 
inconsistent with its “basic educational mission.”3 Schools may 
regulate speech in school-sponsored, expressive activities that 
are related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.4 The school’s 
role is to provide the “fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system” and thus the 
Court has made exceptions to First Amendment protections in 
order to allow the school to achieve these democratic notions 
of education.5 
Despite the expansive role of schools in monitoring student 
speech, the Court has limited its analysis to speech that takes 
place on school grounds or during school-related activities. 
                                                 
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1985).  
2 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).  
3 Id. at 685.  
4 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).  
5 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).  
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Promoting values through schooling has not been expanded to 
off-campus speech that is disseminated through the Internet. 
This is problematic as the Internet is playing an increasingly 
important role in the lives of children. What students say over 
the Internet, specifically on social networking sites like 
MySpace and Facebook, is published material that can easily be 
seen and read by their peers who most likely attend the same 
school. When this written information defames school 
personnel, usually an administrator or teacher, the school has 
an interest in punishing this conduct. On the other hand, the 
student has a right to free speech, especially within the 
confines of his or her own home. Punishing students for what 
they write on their home computers also can infringe on 
parents’ right to raise their own children. 
Traditionally, courts have relied on the Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District standard, 
which holds that a school can punish student speech when that 
speech “materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work and 
discipline of the school.”6 However, this standard is 
unworkable when punishing students for what they write on 
the Internet from their home computers. This test was meant 
to apply to student speech that occurs on school grounds.7 
Further, the Tinker standard addresses school disruption, 
which is not the main concern regarding student Internet 
speech.8  
No matter how courts rationalize their decisions, schools, 
teachers, and administrators defend Internet student speech 
cases involving school officials because of two prevailing 
concerns: (1) the school official targeted by the student speech 
will have his or her authority undermined;9 and (2) the 
democratic goals of schooling will be disrupted.10 Similarly, 
individuals bring defamation suits, specifically libel suits, 
against those who speak ill of them because they are concerned 
that their good name will be ruined, their authority will be 
undermined, or that the institution that they are a part of—
                                                 
6 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).  
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
10 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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whether it be a business, a community, or society in general—
will be disrupted by the information that is written about 
them.11 However, while a school official can bring a 
defamation suit, the school itself lacks standing to pursue a 
defamation case against a student. Further, even if a school 
official were to bring a defamation suit, the underlying result 
of the suit—to reward the plaintiff with monetary damages—
will not reinforce the democratic goals of schooling or have 
the impact on the school environment that is required for a 
punishment to be effective.  
Currently, when a student brings a First Amendment claim 
against a school district, the burden is on the school district to 
show that it met the Tinker standard.12 Under this Note’s 
proposed standard, when a student brings a claim, the school’s 
defense would no longer rest on Tinker. Instead, the 
defamation standard in tort would be used as a model to create 
a new First Amendment standard to replace Tinker as a 
defense. Using similar concepts, the standard would allow 
schools to punish off-campus student Internet speech that 
involves a school official and reaches a defamatory level. This 
test would also modify the standards of proof necessary to 
implicate the speech since students are not entitled to full 
constitutional protections as recognized by the Supreme Court 
time and again.13 This standard would only apply to a narrow 
category of speech, specifically off-campus Internet speech 
that defames a school official. Thus, this defense would not 
apply to other types of speech like offensive speech or true 
threats. This standard would also not apply to student-on-
student defamatory speech or cyber bullying. While these are 
important concerns, they fall outside the reach of this new 
standard and therefore, outside the purview of this Note.  
This Note urges the Supreme Court to adopt a standard 
that will continue to balance a student’s right to free speech 
with a school’s need to advance appropriate values. Part II 
explains the history of Court decisions that modified 
                                                 
11 Libel, an action in tort, punishes published speech about the plaintiff that 
injures the plaintiff’s reputation through false statements of fact. MARSHALL S. 
SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW § 66.01 (3d ed. 2010). 
12 Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are “Persons” Under Our 
Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2009).  
13 See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 
(1986). 
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constitutional protections for students. Part III discusses the 
circuit split that currently exists between the Second and Third 
Circuits with regard to how schools can punish what students 
say about school personnel on the Internet. Part IV examines 
the problems associated with using the Tinker standard in the 
Second and Third Circuit cases. Part V explores why civil 
defamation is not an appropriate substitute for schools 
punishing the student directly. Part VI advocates for the 
adoption of a new First Amendment standard that is modeled 
after the elements of defamation and accounts for the 
modified protections of students. Part VII will apply this new 
standard to the Second and Third Circuit cases and 
demonstrate that the outcomes would not only be different, 
but would resolve any split that currently exists from the 
confusion of applying the Tinker standard.  
II. THE HISTORY OF STUDENT PROTECTIONS 
First Amendment protections are considered expressive 
activities subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.14 Therefore, the 
government cannot restrict free speech without a compelling 
government interest.15 In addition, that regulation needs to 
utilize the least restrictive means possible.16 However, Tinker 
lowered this standard in the school setting. Tinker examined 
the various contexts in which free speech claims relating to 
schools could arise and determined that political, non-school 
sponsored speech could be regulated if there was a “material 
and substantial interference” with the school environment.17 In 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court found that 
the school also had the right to punish offensive, lewd, and 
indecent speech when spoken in the context of a school-
sponsored activity.18 Then, in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, the Court declared that schools could punish 
speech that is part of a school-sponsored activity so long as the 
regulation is reasonably related to a pedagogical concern.19 
                                                 
14 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.01(b) 
(8th ed. 2010). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  
18 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.  
19 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).  
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Instead of the traditional strict scrutiny standard, this rational 
review standard made it very easy for schools to punish 
students. In Morse v. Frederick, the Court continued this trend 
by stating that schools may punish student speech that is 
related to illegal drug use.20 However, the burden has always 
been on the school district to provide a justifiable reason for 
depriving students of their right to free speech.  
The first significant Supreme Court case to address the 
balance between a student’s First Amendment protections and 
a school’s ability to regulate student speech is Tinker.21 In 
Tinker, the Court invalidated a school’s policy prohibiting 
students from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam 
War.22 The Court recognized that First Amendment rights, 
even in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment, are still available to both students and teachers.23 
Yet the Court also addressed its history of reinforcing the 
school’s authority to control student behavior.24 Balancing 
these two interests, the Court, ruling in favor of the students, 
found that schools could not punish student expression only 
to “avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”25 Schools can only 
prohibit student speech that “might reasonably have led school 
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities”26 or actually does 
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline 
of the school.”27 In applying this standard, the Court found 
that there were no facts in the case to show substantial 
disruption. The two inches of black cloth did not disrupt 
school activities or the lives of others. While the armbands may 
have caused discussion outside the classroom, they did not 
                                                 
20 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).  
21 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.  
22 ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE 
SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 13 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009).  
23 Id.  
24 Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Speech About School 
Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 596 
(2011).  
25 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.  
26 Id. at 514. 
27 Id. at 513.  
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interfere with the classroom itself.28  
While Tinker symbolizes the height of student protection, 
this broad standard did not endure. In Fraser, the Court upheld 
the school’s right to suspend a student for making a speech to 
the student body that referred to another candidate in terms 
of an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”29 The 
Court first distinguished Tinker as being about a political 
message, as opposed to sexual conduct.30 Instead of looking to 
whether the speech caused a “substantial disruption,” the 
Court found that the First Amendment does not protect 
“vulgar and lewd” student speech since it has the ability to 
“undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”31 The 
Court also recognized the special environment that a school 
provides. A school needs to be able to respond to 
“unanticipated conduct” that disrupts the educational process.32 
A school has an interest in protecting children from exposure 
to speech that is inappropriate and offensive to minors.33 The 
school is responsible for inculcating values by teaching 
appropriate means of expression.34 While the Court was able to 
reconcile this decision with Tinker, this case was the first 
deviation toward the modern trend of favoring school 
authority over First Amendment protections.  
This trend continued in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, where the Court upheld a school’s policy of 
regulating what types of articles could be published in the 
school’s newspaper.35 Again, the Court established a new 
standard that a school is not required to lend its name and 
resources to the dissemination of student expression.36 
Educators may regulate school-sponsored expression “to assure 
that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed 
to reach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material 
that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that 
the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously 
                                                 
28 Id. at 514.  
29 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986). 
30 Waldman, supra note 24, at 597. 
31 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.  
32 Id. at 686.  
33 Id. at 684. 
34 DUPRE, supra note 22, at 49.  
35 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988). 
36 Id. at 272. 
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attributed to the school.”37 A student’s First Amendment rights 
are not violated when a school exercises editorial control of 
style and content of school-sponsored student speech “so long 
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”38 Essentially, any student speech that is 
pedagogically opposed to the school’s mission and might be 
confused as school speech is not protected under the First 
Amendment.39  
 Morse v. Frederick is the most recent Supreme Court case 
to address the extent of Tinker.40 In Morse, the Court upheld a 
school’s decision to suspend a student for unraveling a sign 
that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored 
event.41 The Court found that deterring drug use by school 
children is an “‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ 
interest” because of the dangers that it can pose to youth.42 In 
light of various congressional statements and school board 
policies, the Court found that the special environment of the 
school and the governmental interest in stopping student drug 
abuse outweighs students’ interest in freedom of expression.43 
The school needs to be able to immediately react to situations 
that violate school policy and need not tolerate speech that 
promotes the dangers of illegal drug use.44  
 Morse’s interpretation of a school’s authority to regulate 
student speech left an uncertain impact on the future of 
student First Amendment protections.45 While the case 
specifically allowed school administrators to punish student 
speech that promoted illegal drug use,46 the implications of the 
case are much broader. The case leaves open the possibility that 
                                                 
37 Id. at 271.  
38 Id. at 273.  
39 Rosemary Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of 
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 267–68 (1992).  
40 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
41 Id. at 397.  
42 Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).  
43 Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). The court declined to apply the Tinker test, but also declined to consider 
Frederick’s speech as “offensive” under Fraser. Id. at 409. The Court acknowledged 
that much political and religious speech can be deemed offensive, but this case was 
about the promotion of drug use. Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Morse, 551 U.S. at 409. 
46 Id. 
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a school can regulate anything that undermines the school’s 
values. In his concurrence, Justice Alito stated that the 
majority’s opinion “does not endorse the broad 
argument . . . that the First Amendment permits public school 
officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a 
school’s ‘educational mission.’” However, it is not hard to 
imagine other topics that the school would consider equivalent 
to promoting illegal drug use and seek to regulate, such as 
speech encouraging violence, sexual activity, or even skipping 
school.47  
The Morse decision has strayed the farthest from the 
original intent of Tinker to preserve student’s First 
Amendment rights.48 This speech took place on a public street 
and did not cause any substantial disruption to the school 
environment.49 Yet the school was still allowed to punish the 
speech because the speech took place during a school activity 
and could be construed to be about a topic that violates the 
school’s mission.50 Although this holding allows for the 
regulation of speech that takes place off-campus, but has a 
nexus to the school, the Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether Internet student speech that takes place on the 
student’s home computer and is directed at school personnel 
should likewise be regulated. 
III. THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUITS 
The question of whether a school can punish what a 
student writes about school personnel on the Internet from a 
home computer has resulted in a split between the Second and 
Third Circuits. The heart of this issue explores to what extent 
Tinker extends to off-campus speech. The Second Circuit 
addressed this question in two cases: Wisniewski v. Board of 
Education of the Weedsport Central School District51 and 
                                                 
47 Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring); Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. 
Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 21–22 (2008); see also Joyce Dindo, 
The Various Interpretations of Morse v. Frederick: Just a Drug Exception or a 
Retraction of Student Free Speech Rights?, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 201, 233–34 (2008).  
48 Morse, 551 U.S. at 409. 
49 Caroline B. Newcombe, Morse v. Frederick One Year Later: New Limitations 
on Student Speech and the “Columbine Factor,” 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 427, 437 (2009).  
50 Id. at 436–37. 
51 See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d 
Cir. 2007).  
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Doninger v. Niehoff.52 In both cases, the courts applied Tinker 
to off-campus student Internet speech and ruled in favor of 
the schools.  
In Wisniewski, Aaron Wisniewski, an eighth-grader at 
Weedsport Middle School used AOL Instant Messaging 
software on his parents’ home computer to create an “IM icon” 
which showed a drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s 
head, with dots representing splattered blood.53 The drawing 
was labeled “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.”54 Philip VanderMolen 
was Aaron’s English teacher at the time this icon was created.55 
While the icon was not sent to VanderMolen or other school 
officials directly, the icon was sent to fifteen members on his 
“buddy list,”56 some of whom attended Weedsport Middle 
School and could view the icon for three weeks.57 One of 
Aaron’s classmates gave Mr. VanderMolen a copy of the icon.58  
Aaron admitted to creating and sending the icon.59 The 
school initially suspended Aaron for five days and granted 
VanderMolen’s request to stop teaching Aaron’s class.60 The 
police determined that Aaron’s icon was just a joke and that he 
did not intend to actually harm VanderMolen, so criminal 
charges were dropped.61 However, at a superintendent’s 
hearing, the hearing officer determined that the icon was 
threatening and should have not been construed as a joke.62 
Aaron was suspended for one semester and given alternative 
education.63 
In assessing whether the school had the authority to 
suspend Aaron, the Second Circuit held that Tinker was the 
appropriate standard to apply.64 The court ruled in favor of the 
school, finding that even if Aaron’s icon was just an opinion, it 
                                                 
52 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).  
53 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1060 (2008).  
61 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Papandrea, supra note 60, at 1060–61.  
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was not protected under the Tinker standard.65 Not only did 
the icon “materially and substantially disrupt the work and 
discipline of the school,” but it also was reasonably foreseeable 
that the icon would come to the attention of school officials.66 
It did not matter if Aaron never intended for either to occur.67 
The court also found that the mere fact that the speech took 
place off school grounds did not shield Aaron from 
punishment.68  
A year later, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit 
again found that a school had the authority to punish what a 
student wrote on the Internet.69 The court applied 
Wisniewski’s interpretation of Tinker, stating that off-campus 
speech that creates a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption 
in a school “does not necessarily insulate the student from 
school discipline.”70 In Doninger, a dispute arose between 
school administration and a group of Student Council 
members, including Avery Doninger, over the scheduling of 
“Jamfest,” an annual battle-of-the-bands concert.71 Miller, the 
teacher responsible for the auditorium’s sound and lighting 
equipment, could not attend on the scheduled date, and 
without Miller’s presence the students would be forced to 
change the date or the location of the event.72  
Avery and three other students drafted an e-mail to a large 
number of people describing the situation.73 The e-mail told 
recipients to contact Paula Schwartz, the district 
superintendent, to ask that Jamfest be held as scheduled and 
urged the recipients to forward the e-mail to more people.74 
Additionally, Avery posted a message on her blog that said  
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an email that 
we sent to a ton of people . . . because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is 
getting a TON of phone calls and emails . . . however, she got pissed off and 
decided to just cancel the whole thing all together[ and] so basically we aren’t 
                                                 
65 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 37. 
66 Id. at 38–39.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 39.  
69 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2008).  
70 Id. at 50 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.2d at 39).  
71 Id. at 44. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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going to have it at all . . . .75  
Avery then reproduced the e-mail that the Student Council 
members sent out and also included a letter her mom sent to 
Schwartz and Principal Niehoff so that those who read the 
blog could “get an idea of what to write if you want to write 
something or call her to piss her off more.”76 Several students 
posted comments to the blog. One comment referred to 
Schwartz as a “dirty whore.”77  
Schwartz and Niehoff received many phone calls and e-
mails about Jamfest.78 The controversy forced Schwartz and 
Niehoff to miss or arrive late to several school-related 
activities.79 When Niehoff learned of the blog, she decided 
that Avery’s conduct did not “display the civility and good 
citizenship expected of class officers.”80 The blog contained 
“vulgar language” and “inaccurate information” and did not 
demonstrate the proper way to confront school officials.81 As a 
result, Niehoff prohibited Avery from running for Senior 
Class Secretary.82  
The Second Circuit, applying Wisniewski, found that 
Avery’s blog involved school events and was written to 
encourage others to comment on the post and to call and e-
mail school personnel.83 Therefore, it was reasonably 
foreseeable that students and administrators would find out 
about the blog.84 Additionally, the court pointed to three 
factors that showed Avery’s blog would create a foreseeable 
risk of substantial disruption.85 First, the language in the blog 
was “plainly offensive” and had the potential to inhibit 
cooperative conflict resolution.86 Second, the blog misled 
students to believe Jamfest had been cancelled, which caused 
                                                 
75 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45 (third alteration added).  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 46.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Papandrea, supra note 60, at 1062. 
83 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46. 
84 Papandrea, supra note 60, at 1064.  
85 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. 
86 Id. at 50–51.  
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students to get “‘all riled up’” and- to threaten a sit-in.87 Avery 
and the other students involved had to be pulled away from 
class or other activities to address the dispute.88 Schwartz and 
Niehoff also missed or arrived late to activities because of the 
dispute.89 Finally, the court thought that it was significant that 
Avery’s punishment was removal from participation in student 
government—an extracurricular activity, which is a privilege, 
not a right.90 Avery’s activities undermined the ideals student 
government is designed to promote, including good 
citizenship, civility, and cooperative conflict resolution.91 
Therefore, Avery’s speech was not protected by the First 
Amendment.92  
The Third Circuit has also addressed this question of 
Internet student speech in two cases: Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District93 and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District.94 
The Third Circuit’s original rulings on both cases resulted in 
an internal circuit split.95 Therefore, both cases were reheard en 
banc in June 2011.96 Each case was decided in favor of the 
student.97 However, whether the Tinker standard should apply 
to off-campus student Internet speech was not definitively 
decided by either majority, but was raised as an issue in the 
concurring and dissenting opinions of both cases.98  
In Layshock, Justin Layshock, a student at Hickory High 
School, used his grandmother’s computer to create a “parody 
profile” on MySpace of his principal Eric Trosch.99 Besides 
using a picture of Trosch from the school district’s website, no 
school resources were used in the making of the profile.100 
Justin gave a series of answers to survey questions that were 
                                                 
87 Id. at 51.  
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
90 Papandrea, supra note 60, at 1062.  
91 Id.  
92 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 53. 
93 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
94 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
95 Layshock, 593 F.3d 249; J.S., 593 F.3d 286.  
96 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 205; J.S., 650 F.3d at 915. 
97 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 205; J.S., 650 F.3d at 915. 
98 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220; J.S., 650 F.3d at 936. 
99 Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207.  
100 Id.  
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based on being “big” since Trosch is a large man.101 Examples of 
questions and answers include:  
Birthday: too drunk to remember 
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak 
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt  
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills 
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick 
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg 
Ever been drunk: big number of times 
Ever been called a Tease: big whore 
Ever been Beaten up: big fag 
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart 
Number of Drugs I have taken: big
102
 
Justin listed Trosch’s interests as “transgender, appreciators 
of alcoholic beverages” and listed “steroids international” as a 
club to which Trosch belonged.103 Justin listed other students as 
“friends” on the MySpace page, which allowed them to view 
the profile.104 As a result, most, if not all, of the student body 
found out about the profile.105 Following Justin’s profile, three 
other students made profiles of Trosch that were more vulgar 
and offensive than Justin’s.106  
Trosch discovered all four profiles and believed the 
profiles were “‘degrading,’ ‘demeaning,’ ‘demoralizing,’ and 
‘shocking.’”107 He was also concerned about his reputation and 
contacted the local police, but he never filed criminal 
charges.108 Justin made several in-school attempts to access the 
profile and show it to other students, which the school did not 
know about until their investigation the following week.109 
School officials were forced to limit school Internet access and 
cancel computer-programming classes.110  
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The school held a hearing and found Justin guilty of 
violating several provisions of the school discipline code.111 He 
was suspended for ten days, placed in the Alternative 
Education Program for the remainder of the school year, 
banned from all extracurricular activities, and denied 
participation in his graduation ceremony.112 Justin was the only 
one of the four profile creators to be punished.113  
 The Third Circuit reversed the school’s actions to rule in 
favor of the student,114 primarily due to the district court’s 
finding that there was not a “sufficient nexus between Justin’s 
speech and a substantial disruption of the school 
environment.”115 Since the school district did not challenge this 
finding on appeal, the school district did not argue that it 
could properly punish Justin under the Tinker standard.116 The 
school district argued that a “sufficient nexus exist[ed] 
between Justin’s creation and distribution of the vulgar and 
defamatory profile of Principal Trosch and the school district 
to permit the school district to regulate this conduct” because 
Justin used Trosch’s picture from the district website, the 
speech was aimed at the school and the principal, Trosch 
accessed the website from a school computer, and it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the school district and principal 
would discover the website.117 The Third Circuit found, 
however, that the minimal use of school resources in 
connection with the website was not enough to create a nexus 
with the school.118  
Since the school district did not dispute the Tinker finding, 
it also rested its argument on Fraser, which does not tolerate 
lewd and vulgar speech.119 The school district cited both 
Wisniewski and Doninger as support.120 However, the court 
noted that Fraser does not extend to speech outside the school 
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doors.121 Further, the court distinguished both Wisniewski and 
Doninger by stating that in both cases the court found that 
there was a substantial disruption to the work and discipline of 
the school under Tinker.122 The court clearly noted that it did 
not necessarily support the finding of Doninger, but 
distinguished the case as a means of responding to the school’s 
argument.123 The court noted that while Tinker may not be 
limited to the school yard, “it would be an unseemly and 
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school 
authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her 
actions there to the same extent that it can control that child 
when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”124  
 Since the school district did not contest the district 
court’s finding that there was no substantial disruption to the 
school environment,125 the question remains as to what extent 
Tinker applies to off-campus speech. The concurrence 
addressed this issue head-on and concluded that Tinker should 
apply to off-campus speech.126 The concurrence referred to two 
specific quotes in Tinker that support this statement. First, the 
concurrence cited Tinker to state that student speech “‘in class 
or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others is’” not protected by the First Amendment.127 
Secondly, the concurrence cited Tinker to say that “‘facts 
which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast 
substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities’” can be punished.128  
Recognizing that the Internet has no “place,” the 
concurrence stated that trying to put physical boundaries on 
the First Amendment could only lead to serious problems with 
a school’s ability to discipline.129 Using modern technology, a 
substantial disruption can be caused by speech that takes place 
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off-grounds.130 The concurrence compared this situation to 
falsely shouting “fire” in a theater.131 Whether the person is 
standing inside the theater or right outside shouting in, the 
resulting panic and the resulting punishment would be the 
same.132 That rationale applied in this context should also result 
in the school being able to punish disruptive speech that occurs 
both inside and outside the school.133 School officials have the 
difficult job of maintaining an environment conducive to 
learning, and applying Tinker would preserve their 
authority.134  
 The court filed its opinion for J.S. v. Blue Mountain 
School District on the same day as Layshock.135 Using her 
parent’s home computer, J.S. and her friend K.L created a fake 
Myspace profile under the name of their principal, James 
McGonigle.136 The profile contained McGonigle’s official 
photograph from the school district’s website.137 The principal 
was given the name “M-Hoe” and was identified as a bisexual, 
Alabama middle school principal.138 The profile contained 
“crude content and vulgar language” ranging from juvenile 
humor to personal attacks aimed at the principal and his 
family.139 Under “M-Hoe’s” interests, the profile read 
“detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain, spending 
time with my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball, my 
golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students and their 
parents.”140 Under the “about me” section, the profile read:  
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. It’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, 
sex addict, fagott . . . put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] I 
have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principal’s [sic] to 
be just like me. I know, I know, you’re all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to 
myspace is because—I am keeping an eye on you students (who[m] I care for 
so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school[,] I 
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love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick 
head, and last but not least my darling wife who looks like a man (who 
satisfies my needs) MY FRAINTRAIN[.]
141
 
J.S. said she intended the profile to be a joke.142 Initially the 
profile was open to anyone, but the following day J.S. made it 
private so that only “friends” could view it.143 Since the school 
computers blocked Myspace, no student ever viewed the 
profile at school.144 McGonigle learned about the profile from 
another student who eventually brought a copy of the website 
to McGonigle upon his request.145  
After J.S. admitted to creating the profile, McGonigle 
suspended J.S. and K.L. for ten days.146 He decided not to press 
criminal charges.147 The school district said the profile created 
“general rumblings” in the school.148 Additionally, two teachers 
said that the profile was discussed during their class time, 
which created a disruption, and one of the teachers had to tell 
the students to stop talking several times and was forced to 
raise his voice.149 However, the teacher admitted that it was 
common for students to talk in class.150 Students approached 
another teacher to talk about the profile, but this teacher said 
class time was not disrupted.151 Counselor Frain also had to 
reschedule several student meetings because of the disruption 
the profile created.152 
 The Third Circuit assumed, but did not decide, that 
Tinker applied in this case.153 Applying Tinker, the court found 
that there was no substantial disruption to the school.154 The 
court said that the profile was a joke and could only be viewed 
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by friends.155 The profile did not identify who McGonigle was 
by name, school, or location.156 Additionally, the profile was 
“so juvenile and nonsensical that no reasonable person could 
take its content seriously.”157 The only reason that the profile 
was brought into school was because McGonigle requested it 
be brought to him.158 Besides a few minutes of talking, no 
disruption occurred during class time.159 The court found that 
if Tinker’s black armbands could not have reasonably led 
school authorities to forecast disruption then neither could 
J.S.’s profile.160  
 Although the dissent in J.S. acknowledged the split with 
the Second Circuit, the majority denied its existence.161  The 
majority stated that the dissent overstated the Second Circuit’s 
holdings. 162 The majority also dismissed the school district’s 
argument that under Tinker, the school could punish J.S. 
because the profile defamed McGonigle.163 The school district 
based this argument on the language in Tinker, which states 
that school officials could stop conduct that would “invad[e] 
the rights of others.”164 The court found that there have been 
no decisions expanding this language to those who are not 
students.165 Further, the court found that broadening this 
language would pose a danger to First Amendment 
protections.166 The court also said J.S.’s speech could not be 
regulated under Fraser because Fraser does not apply to off-
campus speech.167 
 Once again, though, the question of whether Tinker 
applies to off-campus speech was left open. The concurrence in 
J.S., however, declared that Tinker should not apply to off-
campus speech and that the First Amendment protects 
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students’ off-campus speech to the same extent it protects that 
of other citizens.168 Applying Tinker to off-campus speech 
would “create a precedent with ominous implications” and 
would allow schools to regulate student speech “no matter 
where it takes place, where it occurs or what subject matter it 
involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at 
school.”169 Further, while J.S.’s speech may lack value, such 
speech gives students an outlet to vent their frustrations 
without resorting to violence.170 Applying Tinker to off-
campus speech also leaves open the possibility that adults in the 
community can be punished for what they say when it causes a 
substantial disruption to the school environment.171  
Yet the concurrence also noted that deciding where speech 
takes place can be very complicated.172 Whether speech takes 
place on- or off-campus cannot “turn solely on where the 
speaker was sitting when the speech was originally uttered.” 173 
Speech that is purposely sent to the school via e-mail could be 
punished, but speech that could foreseeably make its way onto 
campus should not be punished.174 The First Amendment 
should be applied normally and as a result J.S.’s speech is 
protected.175  
 The dissent in J.S. asserted that the Tinker standard was 
not properly applied to the facts of the case.176 Tinker was not 
intended to protect J.S.’s type of speech.177 Even though no 
substantial disruption occurred, the profile’s potential to cause 
disruption was reasonably foreseeable, which is sufficient 
under Tinker.178 The speech could have interfered with the 
educational environment by undermining McGonigle’s 
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authority and disrupting the educational progress179 or by 
disrupting the operations of the classroom by not allowing 
McGonigle and Frain to do their jobs. 180 The educational 
process was undermined by accusing McGonigle of having sex 
in his office, hitting on students and parents, and being a sex 
addict, as well as the statement “I love children [and] sex (any 
kind).”181  
The dissent also argued that J.S.’s speech could cause school 
officials to suffer psychological harm. McGonigle was 
“embarrassed, belittled, and possibly defamed” by J.S.’s 
speech.182 Not punishing this speech sends a message that the 
school is condoning the student’s actions.183 Tolerating 
insubordinate speech is contrary to the democratic notions of 
education and the school’s role of inculcating values.184 The 
school also needs the authority to punish this speech because 
of the speech’s potential impact on the community.185 Parents 
and other teachers could question McGonigle’s character, 
especially with regards to his position as an educator 
responsible for constantly interacting with children.186 Parents 
could also foreseeably be worried about having a man who 
engages in certain sexual behavior around their children.187  
Furthermore, allowing this type of speech to go 
unpunished could also lead teachers who are attacked to leave 
the school or their profession entirely.188 Those who stay in the 
profession may be so affected by the incident that they 
become anxious and depressed and are not able to be effective 
in the classroom or to maintain relationships with their 
students.189 McGonigle and Frain would thus be less effective 
as educators if they were unable to punish J.S.190  
 Unlike the majority, the dissent acknowledged that the 
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J.S. decision caused a split with the Second Circuit.191 The 
Second Circuit extended Tinker to apply to “off-campus 
hostile and offensive student internet speech that is directed at 
school officials [and] results in a substantial disruption of the 
classroom environment.”192 The majority distinguished 
Wisniewski and Doninger because J.S.’s speech could not be 
taken seriously, and J.S. did not intend for the speech to reach 
campus.193 However, the dissent stated that the court ignored 
the other harmful effects of the speech and the fact that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach campus.194  
 
IV. WHY TINKER SHOULD NOT APPLY TO OFF-CAMPUS 
INTERNET STUDENT SPEECH 
 Wisniewski, Doninger, J.S., and Layshock make it 
apparent that Tinker does not adequately apply to off-campus 
speech. The Tinker standard was intended to regulate on-
campus speech.195 Solely due to the off-campus nature of the 
speech, courts have difficulty determining whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the speech would cause a 
substantial disruption to the school environment and whether 
the off-campus speech amounted to more than a mere 
apprehension of disturbance.196 Applying Tinker to these cases 
results in decisions turning on specific facts and unpredictable 
outcomes. 
Courts’ lack of experience with the practical school-based 
consequences of student Internet speech only exacerbates the 
problem of applying Tinker. Tinker was meant to punish 
speech that clearly interferes with the educational process.197 
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Therefore, when a teacher’s ability to carry out a lesson is 
clearly impaired, the teacher can take measures to remedy the 
situation. However, disruptions that come from the Internet 
do not always have the same immediate impact that occurs 
during an on-campus incident. While there are plenty of 
instances where a teacher is no longer able to teach because of 
Internet speech,198 many times the disruption caused by 
Internet speech is more properly classified as intangible or 
emotional harm, as opposed to the traditional physical or 
tangible disruption described in Tinker.199 Intangible harm, like 
a general disrespect for a teacher’s authority, is much more 
difficult to measure. The community’s response to the speech 
can also be hard to measure. If the community takes the speech 
seriously, it can result in an atmosphere of contempt. It is this 
harm to the school environment that is left without a remedy 
under Tinker. The Second and Third Circuit’s attempt to 
distinguish this intangible harm is what has complicated these 
decisions.  
 Further, extending the Tinker standard to Internet 
speech has the potential to expand a school’s authority to 
punish students in unnecessary ways. The Internet is a forum 
for students to express their feelings on various topics and this 
may not always be conducive to the messages that the school 
seeks to promote. Students are entitled to criticize the 
educational process and those that contribute to it. If a school 
is allowed to punish mere “name calling,” the essential aspects 
of First Amendment protections are lost.200  
 Finally, Tinker holds that any speech that is reasonably 
foreseeable to cause a substantial disruption may be 
punished.201 This idea was expanded by the cases in the Second 
Circuit to justify punishing the student.202 According to the 
Second Circuit, as long as it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
speech would come onto school grounds and cause a material 
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disruption, it could be punished by the school.203 Yet with the 
Internet, few instances exist where it would not be reasonably 
foreseeable that the speech would reach school grounds. The 
speech could be brought onto campus by another student, 
searched for on the Internet by a curious school official, or 
overheard in gossip and rumors among students and 
teachers.204 There is virtually no such thing as private Internet 
speech. It should be assumed that what a student writes on the 
Internet could make its way onto school grounds. The Second 
and Third Circuits have relied on Tinker and come to varied 
conclusions because the courts have no other standard to rely 
on, not because it is the most applicable standard. This is clear 
from the debate between the concurring and dissenting judges 
in Layshock and J.S., as well as the majority’s clear avoidance of 
the issue in both of these cases. Therefore, courts need a better 
standard to distinguish the school from the home and a way to 
preserve a parent’s right to govern speech that takes place 
within the home.  
 V. WHY DEFAMATION IN TORT IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE 
REMEDY 
 An ultimate decision not to bring criminal charges 
against the offending student is a recurring theme in the 
Second and Third Circuit cases.205 While the teacher or 
principal involved in each case debated pursuing charges, 
ultimately they realized that a lawsuit would not be a 
successful means of remedying the situation.206 The police even 
stated in one instance that the person hurt would be unlikely 
to prevail.207 Therefore, the only possible remedy left was a 
civil suit, most likely under the tort of defamation.208 While 
defamation is a possible solution, it is an extremely difficult 
case to prove and does not address the immediate harm 
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suffered by the school itself.209  
 Yet those against extending Tinker to speech outside the 
school look to the availability of tort remedies, such as 
defamation and libel specifically.210 Defamation has 
traditionally been governed by state law. While each state 
differs on its requirements for defamation, the basic elements 
of defamation, specifically libel, are that (1) the defendant 
must publish (2) material that sufficiently identifies the 
plaintiff (3) which injures the plaintiff’s reputation (4) by false 
statements, purportedly of fact, or of opinion implying the 
existence of facts and (5) is unprivileged.211 A statement is 
considered defamatory if it falsely “tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or 
dealing with him.”212 To be published, it is only required that 
the defendant communicate information to a third party.213 In 
most defamation cases, plaintiffs are allowed to recover 
general damages.214 This means that a plaintiff can recover for 
the emotional trauma and harm suffered as a result of the 
reputational injury without any proof beyond the defamatory 
nature of the communication.215  
While defamation is a tort remedy, it overlaps with First 
Amendment law, complicating the remedy by placing 
constitutional constraints on what must be shown to recover. 
New York Times v. Sullivan implemented a higher standard of 
actual malice for defamation suits by public officials.216 The 
case addressed a full-page advertisement in The New York 
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Times that was signed by prominent religious, entertainment, 
and community leaders asking for donations to defend Martin 
Luther King, Jr. against perjury and to assist with the Civil 
Rights struggle.217 The advertisement contained several false 
statements.218 The Montgomery City Commissioner Sullivan, 
whose duty it was to oversee the police, filed a defamation 
action against The New York Times and four of the people 
who had signed their names to the advertisement.219 The 
Supreme Court, finding that Alabama’s defamation law was 
too lenient and fearing the chilling effect a lenient standard 
could have on free speech, established a new standard for 
defamation actions against public officials.220 The Court 
ultimately held that a public official may not recover damages 
for a defamatory statement relating to his or her official 
conduct unless it can be shown that the statement was made 
with “actual malice,” that is, with “knowledge that it was false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”221 
This heightened standard increased the difficulty of public 
officials’ recovering in defamation suits.222  
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court addressed the 
standard that private individuals must meet in order to show 
defamation by publishers or broadcasters.223 States must have 
defamation standards requiring some degree of fault, meaning 
a minimum of negligence.224 The Court also found that by 
finding at least negligence, the party could recover for “actual 
injury,” which was expanded to include “impairment of 
reputation and standing in the community, personal 
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.”225 The 
Supreme Court has not addressed cases involving private 
individuals against private individuals, so the common law 
elements of defamation continue to control these types of 
cases.226  
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With more case law regulating the constitutional 
boundaries of defamation in tort, defamation is not an easy 
case for a teacher or principal to bring against a student. First, 
courts are split over whether school principals and teachers are 
public figures, which means that they must show actual malice 
to succeed in a defamation suit.227 For those school officials in 
jurisdictions with the heightened standard of proof, the case 
becomes even more difficult to bring. Additionally, forcing a 
school official to wait for a defamation suit to take place, does 
not allow the school to stop the disruption immediately.228 The 
student may have graduated by the time the suit is brought, 
and by that time the harm is already done. Even though the 
student may still be prosecuted, without immediate 
punishment, the school cannot set an example for other 
students that such behavior is unacceptable. This is important 
because Tinker and its progeny demonstrate that schools 
impose punishments to seek retribution and deter other 
students from repeating the same conduct. However, school 
punishments are only effective when they are understandable 
to students. Students do not appreciate the consequences or 
availability of a defamation suit in the way they would 
understand suspension or expulsion. In a defamation suit, the 
student’s parents would have to pay the judgment and the 
student would remain in school. The consequences of a school 
punishment, rather than the monetary punishment imposed by 
a defamation suit, are much more palpable for the student and 
can serve as a more effective deterrent. Additionally, in a 
defamation suit, the person written about is the one who is 
able to seek a remedy. Yet when a student writes about a school 
official, the harm is not just to the victim, but also to the 
school and the school district. The authority of the school as a 
whole is undermined when students cannot be properly 
punished and monitored and when students do not trust in the 
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authority of the people in charge. A defamation suit does not 
properly remedy this school-wide injury.  
Further, bringing a lawsuit is very costly.229 Many school 
officials do not have the proper means or resources to initiate a 
suit or carry it to trial, especially on a teacher’s or principal’s 
average salary.230 Even if the school official could afford to 
carry out a suit and subsequently won, the student and his or 
her family may be judgment-proof.231 Additionally, a real 
defamation suit requires individuals to “air their dirty 
laundry,” involving an investigation into much of their private 
background. Most people would rather not bring a lawsuit 
than allow the public to pry into their personal lives. Finally, 
schools, and not courts, are in the best position to determine 
whether the speech had a harmful effect on the school 
environment. This is because schools understand the special 
environment of a school and the need to address certain issues 
that would not normally be problems in other settings.232  
The availability of a tort remedy is not sufficient as a 
substitute for regulating student speech under the First 
Amendment. However, there is a way to apply constitutional 
remedies to the special school setting without fully removing a 
student’s constitutional protections and without hindering a 
school’s ability to regulate student behavior. As shown by 
Tinker, the First Amendment standard was modified in order 
to fit the needs of schools. Although that standard may no 
longer be applicable for cases of Internet speech, the idea 
behind the standard was to make more lenient constitutional 
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standards for students.233 The same concept has been applied to 
Fourth Amendment rights. In New Jersey v. TLO, the Court 
modified search and seizure protections so that school officials 
may inspect a student’s belongings when they have a 
reasonable suspicion—a lower standard than probable cause—
that a student has violated school rules.234 Essentially, there is a 
trend of modifying constitutional protections for students 
that should be an important consideration when balancing the 
rights of students and schools. 
VI: APPLYING A MODIFIED DEFAMATION STANDARD TO FREE 
SPEECH 
 The best way to address concerns about defamation of 
school officials is not through defamation in tort, but rather 
through the application of a modified defamation standard to 
students’ First Amendment rights. Essentially, the elements of 
defamation should be used as a model in order to determine 
what off-campus Internet speech a school can and cannot 
punish. The modified defamation standard would replace the 
Tinker constitutional standard in cases brought by students 
against schools for alleged violations of First Amendment 
rights. Therefore, if a school punishes a student and the 
student brings a claim against the school district that his or her 
First Amendment rights have been infringed, the court must 
rely on the following standard to determine if the school was 
within its rights to punish the student. This standard would 
also be used in schools’ official policies regarding speech that is 
punishable. This would allow school rules to flow from court 
orders, truly connecting the two regulating institutions. 
Additionally, the following method would allow the school to 
react immediately, while constraining the school from 
punishing speech that does not rise to a defamatory level.  
 Using defamation as a model, the new standard proposes 
that a student should be punished if the student’s statement 
about the school official (1) is defamatory, (2) is published by 
the student, (3) is related to a school official who works in the 
school itself, (4) is related to the official’s capacity in his or her 
role as a school official, and (5) rises to the level of negligence. 
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There would be no requirement to prove monetary damages, 
nor would there be a requirement to prove that the statement 
resulted in actual reputational harm, just that it had the 
potential to do so.  
 First, the student’s statement must be defamatory. A 
statement is defamatory if it “tends to expose the plaintiff to 
public contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, or induce an 
evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, 
and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.”235 
A student’s statement must rise to this level because, while the 
Supreme Court has recognized that students’ First Amendment 
rights are not lost at the schoolhouse gate,236 schools have an 
obligation to preserve their educational missions. This 
balancing act means that schools do not have the authority to 
regulate student opinions and thoughts that are simply 
upsetting to the victim, especially when the speech takes place 
off school grounds. Internet speech, however, falls into a gray 
area because Internet speech written at home has no physical 
connection to the school grounds, but is also not restricted to 
the privacy of the student’s home. Therefore, student Internet 
speech is neither subject to full First Amendment protections, 
nor subject to full school control.  
While the Supreme Court has never overruled Tinker, 
through subsequent cases, the Court continues to distinguish 
Tinker and chip away at protections for student speech. Fraser 
carves out an exception for “vulgar and lewd” because it 
“undermine[s] the school’s basic educational mission” and the 
school does not want other students exposed to that 
language.237 Hazelwood allows schools to remove school 
newspaper articles on divorce and pregnancy to make sure that 
“readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be 
inappropriate for their level of maturity.”238 Similarly, 
defamatory speech undermines a school’s mission by imposing 
reputational harm on school officials, and the school has an 
interest in preventing other students from being exposed to 
this speech in order to prevent them from mimicking that 
behavior. The political speech in Tinker goes to the heart of 
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the First Amendment in a way that vulgar speech, school-
sponsored speech, and reputational harm does not. Defamatory 
speech is easily aligned with prior Supreme Court decisions as 
an exception to the broad standard of Tinker and can be 
categorized as the type of student speech a school should be 
able to regulate. 
 The next element is that the student must publish the 
statement. To meet this standard, the student must have 
written the statement online and have it read by a third party. 
However, to make this more specific and applicable to the 
school setting, the third party must be a school official or 
another student at the school. Students and other school 
officials would have the greatest impact on whether a teacher’s 
or principal’s authority is undermined. Therefore, if just the 
student’s parents read the online speech, this element would 
not be met. It must be read by a person who has the ability to 
spread the information to other individuals at the school.  
 The third element requires that the person being written 
about is a school official who works in the school. This would 
mainly apply to principals, teachers, deans, guidance 
counselors, and others in positions of authority within the 
school, but not to superintendents or members of the school 
board. If the official serves in multiple roles, then the court 
must evaluate which role was implicated when the statement 
was made.  
The student’s statement needs to be the proximate cause of 
the school official’s authority being undermined. This includes 
being unable to perform job functions effectively or not 
receiving the same respect as before. While the court would 
have to evaluate the specific facts of the case, students 
generally do not directly interact with someone such as a 
superintendent or a member of the board and do not have the 
same educational relationship. Therefore, the person being 
written about must somehow be directly responsible for the 
student’s education.  
 The fourth element requires that the statement relate to 
the official in his or her capacity as a school official. This 
means that if the statement is unrelated to the educational 
mission of schooling to the point that it does not question a 
school official’s ability to educate, then the statement should 
not be regulated. However, this provision should be read 
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broadly because most defamatory statements will have some 
relation to officials in their educational capacity. Examples of 
statements related to officials in their educational capacity 
include statements that a teacher or principal makes sexual 
advances on students, engages in inappropriate sexual behavior, 
or is having intercourse with another school official. In 
evaluating this element, the court must evaluate the nature of 
the statement and its capacity to have a real effect on the 
school environment.  
 The fifth element asks whether the student’s statement 
rises to the level of negligence—whether the student knew or, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the 
statement was false or would create a false impression in some 
material respect. Alternatively, the standard asks whether a 
reasonable student would believe the statement was true. A 
reasonable student does not have the same means or resources 
to research a topic or a statement, as would a publisher, 
broadcaster, or even an adult. Using an objective standard, if a 
student heard a statement and wrote it online with a 
reasonable belief that the statement had some merit to it, then 
the statement should not be able to be regulated by the school. 
Students do not have the same capacity to filter what they 
hear or to decipher what is true from what is not. Therefore, if 
the court determines that a student wrote the statement and in 
good faith thought the statement was true, that should be 
enough to overcome any punishment.  
 The fifth element requires that the standard be lowered 
from actual malice to negligence in all cases involving a 
student’s defamatory writing about a school official. 
Although some courts consider school officials to be public 
officials in defamation cases, thus requiring them to prove 
actual malice, in instances involving students, the standard 
must be modified to allow schools to regulate student 
behavior. The actual malice standard is too high a burden for a 
school official to meet. Students can claim that they were 
unsure if the statement was false or not. Rumors can be spread 
and students can say that simply hearing the rumor made them 
unsure whether the statement was definitely false. Therefore, 
the standard must be lowered so that schools can punish speech 
that is deemed unacceptable while not completely infringing 
on students’ First Amendment rights. In order to lower this 
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standard, however, it is the school’s responsibility to make 
these standards clear to its students. The school should have an 
official policy that spells out the standard and describes the 
students’ liability. Giving students notice will help ensure that 
students’ procedural due process rights are protected.  
 Unlike defamation in tort, the school would not seek to 
recover damages. It is simply a standard for determining 
whether the school could punish the student’s speech. 
Therefore, there is no requirement under this standard that 
requires the school or the victim to show that there was any 
form of monetary loss. Even further, schools or individuals are 
not required to show that any reputational harm was actually 
suffered. Proving that students no longer listen to a teacher or 
principal in the same way can be difficult to prove. Much of 
the harm a school official will suffer will be emotional or 
intangible. Requiring proof of reputational harm is too high 
of a burden to put on professionals, especially if they are not 
seeking to be compensated. Therefore, all that is required is 
that the statement be defamatory and thus have the potential 
for damaging the reputation of the individual about whom 
the student writes.  
 The policy behind modifying the defamation standard is 
the concern that the authority of the victim, as well as the 
school itself will be undermined. The injury is not just to the 
person who is being written about, but is a school-wide injury. 
The school’s culture and environment suffers when a student 
can write defamatory comments about a school official and 
get away with it.239 When a student cannot be punished, the 
school’s lack of action sets an example that the student is more 
powerful than the principal or teacher.240 As a result, school 
officials will not be able to carry out their educational duties 
effectively, whether this means controlling a classroom or 
enforcing disciplinary measures.241 The school could be 
disrupted to the point where the school and its school officials 
are unable to function. For example, the teacher in Wisniewski 
“became distressed and had to stop teaching the student’s 
class.”242 In a Pennsylvania case, a teacher who was written 
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about on the Internet by a student “suffered stress, anxiety, 
loss of appetite, loss of sleep, loss of weight . . . a general sense 
of loss of well being[,] . . . short-term memory loss[,] . . . an 
inability to go out of the house and mingle with 
crowds[,] . . . headaches[,] and was required to take anti-
anxiety/anti-depressant medication.”243 In a Seventh Circuit 
case, a teacher subjected to anti-homosexual speech suffered a 
“nervous breakdown that ultimately resulted in his 
termination.”244 These examples demonstrate the power that 
Internet student speech can have, the disruption it can cause, 
and why schools need a workable standard by which to punish 
this speech.  
Preventing a school from punishing the student also 
undermines the democratic notions of schooling, which 
includes the inculcation of societal values and morals.245 
Schools are given the great responsibility of teaching students 
cultural norms and the proper way to behave. The Court has 
modified protections for students in order to serve the 
compelling governmental interest of teaching students, and 
this cannot stop just because the speech has exited the school 
door. Public speech on the Internet is no more private than 
shouting a statement into a crowded room. Therefore, there 
must be a way to control what takes place on the Internet. 
There must be a balance between both student and school 
interests; otherwise, Internet speech has the potential to 
damage the fundamental educational mission itself.  
VII. PROPOSED STANDARD APPLICATION 
 While the outcomes of Wisniewski, Doninger, Layshock, 
and J.S. vary, application of the proposed standard will create 
logical and consistent outcomes. The proposed standard applies 
to defamatory Internet speech, which is the prevailing type of 
speech seen in these cases. This standard does not extend to on-
campus speech, which would still be governed by Tinker. For 
example, in Wisniewski, the plaintiff created an “IM icon” 
which showed a drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at his 
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English teacher’s head, with dots representing splattered 
blood.246 This speech could not be classified as defamatory. If 
the claim is found to have merit, the speech is closer to a “true 
threat” and therefore, would not be protected under the First 
Amendment despite Tinker’s protections. However, in this 
case, the speech icon was found not to be indicative of a true 
threat.247 Therefore, under the proposed standard the school 
would not be able to punish the plaintiff.  
If the Supreme Court wanted to regulate off-campus 
threats that were intended as jokes, the Supreme Court could 
extend Tinker to apply, since a threat is more likely to have a 
material and substantial disruption on the school. This type of 
threat could even be justified under the Morse rationale 
because threatening speech could pose a substantial danger to 
the school even when it does not take place directly on school 
grounds. However, this would require extending Morse to 
more than school-sponsored activities. Further, the issue of 
true threats is outside the scope of this Note and is not the 
typical subject matter of Internet student speech.  
 In Doninger, the plaintiff called the school 
administrators “douchebags in central office” and encouraged 
classmates to “piss [Paula Schwartz] off more” by sending 
phone calls and e-mails asking for Jamfest to continue as 
scheduled.248 Applying the proposed standard, it is clear that 
the statement was published on the Internet and related to two 
school officials, a principal and a superintendent. The speech 
regarding Principal Niehoff would qualify as a statement 
regarding a school official that works in the school. However, 
the statements made about Schwartz would fail to meet the 
third prong of this standard because she is a superintendent 
who does not directly work in the school. Therefore, there is 
less of a concern that her ability to work in the school 
environment would be undermined. Applying the fourth 
element to Niehoff, most of the statements made were about 
Schwartz.249 Doninger asked that the phone calls and e-mails be 
send to Schwartz specifically.250 Schwartz was also called a 
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“dirty whore” by someone responding to the blog.251 Further, 
the statement “douchebags in central office”252 most likely 
relates to Schwartz as well, since the principal would not be 
located in the central office.  
Even if Schwartz did qualify under this prong, it is 
unlikely that this statement would rise to the level of 
defamatory speech. While calling the administrators 
“douchebags” can be viewed as disrespectful and would likely 
not be tolerated on school grounds, it does not rise to a level 
that exposes the administrators to public contempt or ridicule. 
No reasonable person would think that this phrase would 
destroy administrators’ reputation, as it does not accuse them 
of participating in unacceptable conduct or undermine their 
ability to do their jobs. Therefore, under the proposed 
standard, Doninger would not have been punished.  
The Second Circuit case holdings under the proposed 
standard starkly contrast with the recent outcomes in the 
Third Circuit cases. In Layshock, the plaintiff accused the 
principal of using steroids and drugs, drinking, shoplifting, 
and being a transgender individual.253 Under the proposed 
standard, this statement was published and related to a school 
official in his role as such. These statements can easily be 
argued to be defamatory. They accuse the principal of 
committing illegal acts and expose his reputation as a role 
model for children to ridicule. These statements could change 
the opinion of parents, students, and other school workers 
with regards to how they view the principal. The statements 
also reflect poorly on the character and reputation of the 
principal. Although being transgendered is becoming more 
acceptable in society, many people still do not condone this 
lifestyle.254 Further, although drinking is a legal activity for 
adults, the perception that the principal is a heavy drinker, 
when he works so closely with children, could expose him to 
                                                 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
254 See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Ruling Extends Sex-Discrimination Protection to 
Transgender Woman Denied Federal Job, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/us/sex-discrimination-protection-extended-to-
transgender-woman.html?_r=0 (describing employment discrimination against a 
transgendered individual that resulted in a favorable ruling for the individual by the 
EEOC). 
392                B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2013 
 
public ridicule and contempt. Finally, this statement could rise 
to the level of negligence since the student admitted to 
knowing that the statements were false. A reasonable student 
would know that these statements would create a false 
impression about the principal, even if they were intended as a 
joke. Therefore, in Layshock, the school could punish the 
student under the proposed standard.  
 In J.S., the language used by the student was even more 
disturbing. The plaintiff accused the principal of being a sex 
addict and loving children and sex.255 The statement painted the 
principal to be a pedophile.256 Once again, the statement was 
written online and related to a school official in his official 
capacity. Further, the statement could be viewed as 
defamatory. As a principal, McGonigle’s role was to protect the 
welfare of students. Accusing him of loving sex and children 
certainly questions his ability to serve as an effective principal 
and to be around children in the first place. Hearing this 
statement could cause many parents to be concerned about him 
being in an environment with their children, and his 
reputation is clearly undermined if he is accused of having sex 
with children. Additionally, the speech rises to the level of 
negligence because the student admitted to writing a false 
statement, and a reasonable student would know that this 
would cause others to think of McGonigle in a false light. 
Therefore, under the proposed standard, the school could 
punish the student.  
 Under this proposed standard, the Second Circuit cases 
would be decided in favor of the students instead of the 
schools and the Third Circuit cases would be decided in favor 
of the schools. Yet the four decisions would make sense as a 
whole since they would be based on the same definitive 
standard. If the statement were defamatory and met the other 
prongs of the proposed standard, the school could punish the 
student. Under the Tinker standard, the judges themselves 
were confused as to whether they were really applying Tinker, 
so the proposed standard clears up any inconsistencies. The 
proposed standard also punishes defamatory speech, which is 
considered unprotected speech, while protecting students’ 
rights to express their opinions. Both courts tried to achieve 
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this balance, but failed. This proposed standard accomplishes 
their goal.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court has always addressed student free 
speech cases as a balance between First Amendment protections 
and the democratic values of teaching and schooling. Tinker is 
the classic example of modifying First Amendment protections 
for students in order to address both interests. The standard 
proposed by this Note follows suit. Defamatory speech is 
harmful to both school officials and the school itself. This 
Note’s proposed standard would allow schools to more easily 
address the needs of the special school environment and to 
punish defamatory speech. This standard is more appropriate 
than Tinker when addressing the Second and Third Circuit 
split. The school does not have to deal with the difficult task 
of determining exactly which off-campus speech can be 
considered a substantial disruption. Instead, the school can use 
a definitive standard of what is defamatory speech and what 
reasonable students should know about the effects of their 
speech. Therefore, using the common law elements of 
defamation to form the basis of a new First Amendment 
provision is the most appropriate way to address the issue of 
punishing off-campus Internet student speech.  
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